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ROBERT W. HAHN*
United States Environmental Policy:
Past, Present and Future
ABSTRACT
This essay examines the evolution of the EPA and federal environ-
mental policy. It has three objectives: first, to characterize United
States environmental regulation and identify key themes in the
regulatory process; second, to examine the role of the Bush presiden-
cy in affecting environmental policy; and third, to suggest where
federal environmental regulation is headed. The intent here is not to
provide a scorecard on successes and failures in environmental
policy, but rather to highlight the nature of the forces that have
affected and will continue to affect the broad outlines of environmen-
tal policy.
1. INTRODUCTION
The United States now spends more than any other country in
the world on cleaning up the environment. In 1993, $140 billion was
spent on the environment, or about 2.4 percent of GNP.',2 These
expenditures are a direct result of laws regulating the environment,
which are administered by the United States Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA). The EPA is, arguably, the most powerful agency in the
United States that regulates health, safety or the environment. Since its
inception in 1970, the EPA has been given an increasing amount of
responsibility and power to control pollution.
* The author is a Resident Scholar at the American Enterprise Institute and an Adjunct
Research Fellow, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University. I would like
to thank Frank Blake, Terry Davies, Chris DeMuth, Don Elliott, Scott Farrow, Art Fraas, Rick
Freeman, Dick Morgenstern and Rob Stavins for offering constructive feedback on this
research. In addition, I gratefully acknowledge the research assistance of Matt Borick,
Elizabeth Baldwin, Suzanne Grover, Michelle Katics and Brooks Shirey. Financial support
was provided, in part, by the National Science Foundation Decision, Risk and Management
Science Program. This paper represents my views and does not necessarily reflect the views
of any individuals or institutions with which I am affiliated.
1. Office of Policy, Planning and Evaluation, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, EPA-
230-11-90-083, Environmental Investments: The Cost of a Clean Environment (1990).
2. Estimates for costs and monetary benefits are given in 1990 dollars unless otherwise
noted. The implicit GNP deflators used to convert figures to 1990 dollars are taken from
Council of Economic Advisers, Economic Report of the President (1991).
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In general, federal environmental policies have had a positive
impact on cleaning up the environment, though the precise magnitude of
this impact is difficult to measure. Overall trends in air quality are
positive for conventional air pollutants, such as sulfur dioxide and lead.
Indeed, since 1970, there has been a downward trend for most significant
air pollutants, with the exception of nitrogen oxides. The picture for toxic
pollutants is less clear, but there is reason to believe that toxic air
pollutant emissions were reduced, and will continue to decline substan-
tially in the future as a result of the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments.
The trends in water quality are less dramatic. Some waterways have
definitely improved, particularly those near urban areas that were highly
polluted in the early 1970s. Other waterways have remained roughly the
same or have deteriorated in quality. The data strongly suggest there has
been great progress on local pollution problems. In the last few years,
there appears to have been substantial progress in reducing the amount
of toxic material produced. Moreover, the health data suggests that the
cancer risk from toxic emissions is relatively small, accounting for only
about two percent of total cancers.3
At a global level, there is less cause for optimism. Major global
concerns include the depletion of stratospheric ozone, climate change, and
the loss of species resulting from the destruction of natural habitats, most
notably forests. Concern with the depletion of the ozone layer in the
stratosphere has led to a concerted international effort to phase out the
use of chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) and halons, the principal chemicals
that cause this depletion. The United States has been one of the leaders
in developing the scientific and economic basis upon which to address
this issue. It is also a signatory to the Montreal Protocol, which calls for
the accelerated phase-out of CFCs and halons. The verdict is still out on
global climate change, as the nations of the world try to develop a set of
policies that will sensibly address this issue. In response to the pervasive
uncertainties associated with climate change, the United States Govern-
ment has developed an aggressive research program with projected
outlays of $954 million in 1991. At the same time, the United States,
under the Bush administration, resisted setting targets and timetables for
greenhouse gas reductions in light of the large scientific uncertainties.
The Clinton Administration agreed to reduce greenhouse gases to their
1990 levels by the year 2000, but the emission reduction strategies
pursued by the two administrations were similar.' The United States is
3. R. Doll & R. Peto, The Causes of Cancer: Quantitative Estinates of Avoidable Risks of Cancer
in the United States Today, 66 J. Natl Cancer Inst. 1193, 1256 (June 1981).
4. Office of Science and Technology Policy, Our Changing Planet: The FY 1992 U.S.
Global Change Research Program (1991).
5. Both administrations basically proposed a "no-regrets" strategy. This strategy would
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also exploring various approaches to preserving forestry and encouraging
more tree planting. Examples include debt-for-nature swaps and domestic
tree-planting programs initiated by the Bush Administration.6
In addition to international issues that affect the global environ-
ment and quality of life, the state of the environment in Eastern Europe,
the Soviet Union, and other developing countries has become a more
salient issue. There is increasing concern about decreases in water and air
quality, soil erosion and the availability of water in less-developed
countries. Government agencies, environmental groups, and businesses
are addressing these issues in a variety of ways, such as increased foreign
investment, help in designing environmental laws and the provision of
technical assistance. In addition, several efforts have highlighted the need
to coordinate environmental and economic policies in ways that promote
environmental protection and economic growth.7
United States federal environmental policies over the last two
decades have met with considerable success in cleaning up the local
environment. Yet, there is a great deal of debate about whether these
policies have been worth the cost. In terms of economic benefits and
costs, the numbers suggest benefits exceed costs for federal policies
regulating air pollution, but fall short of the costs for policies regulating
water pollution, with overall benefits and costs of past environmental
programs being comparable.8 Future environmental regulations are much
less likely to pass narrow benefit/cost tests that are based on the risks
reduced. The reason is that we have already implemented most of the
relatively easy fixes for cleaning up the environment.
Over time, the mission of the EPA has been redefined. Under
Administrator Costle, who served under President Carter, the emphasis
was on reducing health risk. Now, the agency is moving away from
health risk, toward a greater concern with ecology.9 Concern about
global environmental issues and sustainability are coming to the fore as
a new environmental consciousness is beginning to emerge. Elected
officials and the EPA are beginning to develop a new agenda that is more
implement policies that make good sense anyway, prioritizing those that reduce greenhouse
gas emissions. President Clinton's plan is more extensive, yet even with these additions to
the proposal, the plan may fail to reach its targets. See J. Cushman, Clinton Wants to
Strengthen Global Pact on Air Pollution, New York Times, Aug. 16, 1994, at AI0.
6. Council on Environmental Quality, The View from CEQ: A Collection of CEQ Clips,
Speeches and Other Current Information, (Sept. 30, 1991).
7. F. Cairncross, Costing the Earth: The Challenge for Governments, the Opportunities
for Business (1992).
8. P. Portney, Air Pollution Policy, in Public Policies for Environmental Protection (P.
Portney ed., 1990); A. Freeman, Ill, Water Pollution Policy, in Public Policies for Environmen-
tal Protection (P. Portney ed., 1990).
9. Cairncross, supra note 7.
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responsive to the public's demands for environmental progress and the
demands of the environmental groups. This agenda includes a greater
concern for man's relationship to the planet and "sustainable" develop-
ment."0 It also includes a reassessment of how economic tools might be
used to promote environmental quality."
This essay examines the evolution of the EPA and federal
environmental policy. Federal policy is the focus because it has been the
driving force behind the dramatic growth in environmental expenditures
over the last two decades. The paper has three objectives: first, to
characterize United States environmental regulation and identify key
themes in the regulatory process; second, to examine the role of the Bush
Administration in affecting environmental policy; and third, to suggest
where federal environmental regulation is headed. The intent here is not
to provide a scorecard on successes and failures in environmental policy,
but rather to highlight the nature of the forces that have affected and will
continue to affect the broad outlines of environmental policy.
Section 2 provides an introduction to federal environmental
policy in the United States. The impact of the Bush Administration on
environmental policy is evaluated in Section 3. Section 4 considers the
future of federal environmental policy.
2. A SHORT COURSE ON FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY
All three branches of government exert control over important
aspects of federal environmental policy. Congress enacts the laws and
also has some informal control over how the laws are implemented. The
official responsibility for implementing the laws is left to the Executive
Branch. In particular, EPA is primarily responsible for administering most
environmental statutes, though the Department of the Interior and the
Department of Agriculture also play important roles in different policy
arenas. While EPA has generally been the dominant administrative
agency in designing and promulgating regulations, there have been a
number of notable attempts on the part of the Executive Office of the
President, government departments and other regulatory agencies to
influence environmental policy. 2 An inherent source of conflict
between EPA and the White House is that EPA seeks to further its own
agenda while balancing the concerns of Congress and the White House;
in contrast, agencies and individuals representing the Executive Office of
10. H. Daly, Toward Some Operational Principles of Sustainable Development, 2 Ecol. Econ. 1
(1990).
11. R. Hahn, A Primer on Environmental Policy Design (E. Bailey ed., 1989).
12. Examples include policies related to vehicle mileage standards and the introduction
of alternative fuels.
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the President are trying to promote the President's broader agenda. The
courts have also played a major role in shaping environmental policy,
forcing EPA and the states to meet statutory deadlines, and sometimes
calling for the imposition of major sanctions if deadlines are not met.13
There is a great deal of inertia in this system, with the various
institutions imposing important checks and balances. This inertia makes
it difficult for the President to change policy dramatically over the long
term without at least some form of acquiescence from EPA and the
Congress. For example, attempts to streamline or dismantle some
environmental regulations in the early years of the Reagan Administra-
tion were met wiith vigorous resistance from Congress as well as
environmental groups." Indeed, in 1984 Congress passed amendments
to the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, which included
"hammer" provisions that forced the agency to adopt specific regulations
when it was unable to devise satisfactory alternatives within the specified
time frame.' s
There has been a steady increase in EPA's authority since its
inception. Table I provides an overview of the major federal laws, which
EPA has primary responsibility for administering. Some of these laws are
media-specific, targeted, for example, at improving water quality or air
quality. Others cover the use of specific chemicals, such as pesticides or
toxic pollutants.
As can be seen from the table, major environmental laws and
amendments involving EPA have been enacted during all recent
administrations. There is every reason to believe that such laws will
continue to be passed with some regularity. This trend reflects the
public's growing demand for the government to address environmental
concerns. It also reflects our evolving understanding of how laws are
implemented as well as the science governing environmental processes.
13. S. Melnick, Regulation and the Courts (1983); E. Warren & G. Marchant, More Good
Than Harm: A First Principle for Environmental Agencies and Repiewing Courts (1993)
(forthcoming in the Ecol. LQ., Nov. or Dec. 1994).
14. M. Kraft & N. Vig, Environmental Policy from the Seventies to the Nineties: Continuity and
Change, in Environmental Policy in the 1990s: Toward a New Agenda (M. Kraft and N. Vig
eds., 1990).
15. See, for example, R. Hahn, An Evaluation of Options for Reducing Hazardous Waste, 12
Harv. Envtl. L Rev. 201 (1988).
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Table 1
MAJOR FEDERAL LAWS ON THE ENVIRONMENT
IMPLEMENTED BY THE EPA
1970 Clean Air Act Amendments
1972 Federal Water Pollution Control Act
Federal Environmental Pesticides Control Act
Marine Protection Act
1973 Safe Drinking Water Act
1976 * Toxic Substances Control Act
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
1977 Clear Air Act Amendments
Clean Water Act Amendments
1980 Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, &
Liability Act
1984 Resource Conservation and Recovery Act Amendments
1986 Safe Drinking Water Act
Superfund Amendments & Reauthorization Act
1987 Clean Water Act Amendments
Global Climate Protection Act
1988 Ocean Dumping Act
1990 Clean Air Act Amendments
Pollution Prevention Act
Oil Spill Prevention Act
Source: M. Kraft & N. Vig, Environmental Policy from the Seventies to the Nineties: Continuity
and Change, in Environmental Policy in the 1990s: Toward a New Agenda (M. Kraft & N.
Vig eds., 1990) (Updated by author).
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Environmental Quality Trends
The best data on environmental trends in the United States over
the last several decades are for air emissions. Table 2 shows air pollution
emissions for selected. years since 1940. The second part of the table
shows annual growth rates in emissions and pollution by decade.
Since 1970, both lead and total suspended particulates, the two
air pollutants thought to present the greatest health risks to humans, have
declined substantially. Sulfur oxides emissions, a by-product of fuel
combustion, rose between 1940 and 1970 and have generally declined
since then. They will decline substantially over the next decade as power
plants and industrial sources will be asked to cut their total sulfur oxide
emissions to roughly half of 1980 emission levels by the year 2000. The
two pollutants directly affecting ground level ozone-nitrogen oxides and
volatile organic compounds--exhibit similar patterns. Emissions of
nitrogen oxides rose fairly steadily from 1940 to 1980, but have declined
slightly since then. Volatile organic compounds, a major fraction of which
come from automobiles, increased between 1940 and 1970, but have been
reduced substantially as better pollution control systems for vehicle
emissions were introduced. Carbon monoxide, another by-product of
vehicles, exhibits a similar qualitative pattern to volatile organic
compounds.
The story to be gleaned from this air quality data is that
emissions exhibit different trends between 1940 and 1990; however,
between 1970 and 1990, there has been substantial progress in reducing
emissions from all air pollutants, with the exception of nitrogen oxides.
The extent to which these pollution reductions are directly attributable to
the implementation of federal pollution control laws is more difficult to
determine. Federal regulations on the automobile probably stimulated
emission reductions, most notably for carbon monoxide and volatile
organic compounds. In addition, federal regulations phasing out the use
of lead in gasoline had a notable effect, helping to reduce lead emissions
by over 95 percent over the last two decades.16 In contrast, some federal
regulations regulating the emissions of sulfur oxides may have had the
opposite effect. Requiring new power plants to be substantially cleaner
than old plants provided an incentive for plant owners to extend the life
of existing plants.
16. Office of Air Quality Planning and Standards, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency,
EPA-454/R-92-013, National Air Pollutant Emission Estimates, 1900-1991 (1992).
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Table 2
NATIONAL AIR POLLUTANT EMISSIONS
Pollutant (million metric tons per year)
Volatile Carbon Lead
Sulfur Nitrogen Organic Mono- (1000s of
Year Particulates Oxides Oxides Compounds xide short
tons)
1940
1950
1960
1970
1975
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1940-1950
1950-1960
1960-1970
1970-1980
1980-1990
22.8
24.8
21.8
19.0
11.0
9.1
8.0
7.1
7.1
7A
7.9
6.7
6.9
7.5
7.2
7.4
7.4
0.9%
-1.2%
-1.3%
-5.2%
-1.9%
18.1
20.3
20.2
28.4
25.5
22.7
22.5
21.2
20.6
21.5
21.7
20.9
20.5
20.6
20.8
21.1
20.7
6.8
9.4
13.2
19.0
20.3
23.6
20.9
20.0
19.4
19.8
19.4
19.1
19.4
20.0
19.8
19.4
18.8
Percent Annual Growth Rates
1.2%
-0.1%
4.1%
-2.0%
-0.7%
3.8%
4.0%
4.4%
2.4%
-1.8%
2.2%
1.9%
2.2%
-2.0%
-1.9%
80.3
86.4
103.6
123.6
104.8
100.0
77.5
72.5
74.5
71.9
83.1
63.2
63.4
64.7
60.4
67.7
62.1
0.8%
2.0%
1.9%
-1.9%
-3.2%
na
na
na
199.1
143.8
68.0
56.0
54.5
46.6
40.2
18.3
8.4
8.0
7.6
7.2
5.1
5.0
-6.6%
-9.3%
Sources: Office of Air Quality Planning and Standards, U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency, EPA-450/ 4-91-026, National Air Pollutant Emission Estimates, 1940-1990 (1991);
Office of Air Quality Planning and Standards, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, EPA-
454/ R-92-013, National Air Pollutant Emission Estimates 1900-1991 (1992).
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Overall environmental trends in water quality are much more
difficult to assess than air quality trends. There is no good overall
measure of water quality, and the existing data provides a mixed picture
about trends in water quality. There are cleanup successes, such as the
Cuyahoga River, along with problems, such as Boston Harbor and the
Chesapeake Bay. The data for water quality highlight this ambiguity.
Water quality records from the United States Geological Survey's
National Stream Quality Accounting Network, a nationwide sampling
network, provides useful information concerning water quality trends. In
contrast to the data on air quality, which focus on emission trends, the
data on water quality provide measures of the actual pollution levels
measured in streams and rivers. There appears to be no good data at a
national level on actual emissions or effluent into water bodies. This
makes it very difficult to link changes in air and water pollution
regulations to changes in water quality.
Table 3 provides an overview of water quality trends for 1978-
1987.
The primary conclusion to be drawn from the data is that most
of the monitoring stations show no trend upward or downward for most
pollutants. Common ions, such as sodium and chloride, exhibit more
increases than decreases at monitoring stations. Nitrogen pollution also
increased at many stations while phosphorous loadings decreased at a
number of sites. Alkalinity and pH were up in several streams, suggest-
ing the water was less acidic. For the trace metals, the most notable
patterns were for arsenic, cadmium and lead, all of which showed
substantially more decreases than increases. Dissolved oxygen deficit and
bacteria levels, which are traditional measures of water quality, exhibited
few significant trends. To the extent that trends were exhibited by these
measures, there were more decreases in pollution than increases. Relating
these trends to emissions patterns is difficult. Automobile emissions are
a strong candidate for the decline in water lead levels, although the
causality is difficult to show. Controls on emissions from major pollution
sources are possible causes of the declines in cadmium and arsenic,
although there are not conclusive results. The large number of increases
of pH and alkalinity at various sites may be related to reduced emissions
levels in urban areas.
Spring 19941
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Table 3
WATER QUALITY INDICATORS (1978 - 1987)
Row-Adjusted Concentration
N' + 0
Common ions 393 91 42 260
Calcium 393 50 31 312
Magnesium 392 76 25 291
Sodium 393 55 29 309
Potassium 393 42 54 297
Sulfate 393 64 36 293
Chloride 392 65 32 295
Dissolved solids 388 84 22 282
Nutrients and suspended solids 389 67 61 261
Nitrogen 390 82 24 284
Phosphorus 389 12 69 308
Suspended solids 153 13 19 121
DOD and bacteria 380 25 52 302
Oxygen deficit 316 12 39 265
Fecal coliform 390 24 51 315
Fecal streptococcus 366 20 36 310
pH and alkalinity 385 115 12 258
pH 387 91 12 284
Total Alkalinity 385 82 9 298
Trace Metals 1 380 16 53 311
Copper 371 17 27 327
Iron 382 16 59 307
Manganese 375 10 41 324
Nickel 352 12 17 323
Zinc 381 3 20 358
Trace Metals II 367 12 89 266
Arsenic 383 3 94 286
Cadmium 360 4 58 298
Chromium 306 1 13 292
Lead 374 4 45 325
Mercury 360 16 12 332
Silver 321 3 0 318
Selenium 312 14 11 287
'N is the number of stations analyzed; plus, minus, and 0 indicate uptrend, downtrend, and
no trend at the 0.10 significance level. DOD denotes dissolved 02 deficit.
Source: D. Lettenmaier et al., Trends in Stream Quality in the Continental United States, 1978-
1987, in Water Resources Research 327 (Mar. 1991).
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As with air quality, water quality trends vary as the period under
study changes. Examining the period from 1974-1981, one study found
increases, rather than decreases, in cadmium and arsenic. 7 A key
challenge for social scientists is to identify the linkage between particular
pollution control policies and particular trends in environmental quality.
Once this linkage is drawn, it is then possible to estimate the benefits of
particular policies.
These water quality emission trends suggest that there has been
some progress in improving water quality as a result of reducing lead
emissions and emissions from power plants and industrial sources.
Further, there are some noteworthy success stories of how particular
rivers and lakes have been revived. On the basis of the data, however, it
is difficult to predict how general measures of water quality will change
in the future.
A new source of data on toxic emissions, known as the Toxics
Release Inventory (TRI), is likely to have a dramatic impact on the quality
of individual emissions data from firms. It will also have a notable
impact on the way firms do business in the future. Under the Emergency
Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act, passed in 1986 as part of
the Superfund reauthorization package, firms are required to submit
annual reports identifying their emissions into air, water, and land.
Facilities must report the amount of various toxic materials that are
released directly into the environment. They must also note the quantity
of chemicals that are moved off-site to chemical treatment, storage and
disposal facilities. The quality of this data is open to some question.
Firms are not required to verify the data; nor are they required to report
on the range of uncertainty. The quality of the data can be expected to
vary considerably across firms. Assuming that firms generally try to
comply with these requirements, there is reason to believe that the
quality of the data will improve over time as firms learn how to meet the
requirement of the law. EPA believes that the quality of the data has
generally improved over time.
Data have been collected for only five years so far, from 1987-
1991. Despite the short time period, the data exhibit some striking
patterns, some of which are highlighted in Table 4.
17. R. Smith et al., Water Quality Trends in the Nation's Rivers, 235 Science 1607 (1987).
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Table 4
ENVIRONMENTAL DISTRIBUTION OF THE CHANGES IN TRI
RELEASES AND TRANSFERS (1989-1991)
TYPE OF RELEASE RELEASE OR RELEASE OR RELEASE OR
OR TRANSFER TRANSFER TRANSFER TRANSFER
1991 1990 1989
Millions Millions Millions
of Pounds of Pounds of Pounds
Air 1,979.3 2,282.7 2,562.2
Surface Water 243.5 196.8 188.0
Land 421.2 462.7 455.0
Underground Injection 710.2 745.4 1,175.6
Public Sewage 410.6 466.1 558.6
Off-site 654.3 8421x 890.4
TRI Total Releases
& Transfers 4,419.2 4,996.2 5,829.8
CHANGE CHANGE
1989-1991 1990-1991
Percent Percent
Air -22.7 -13.3
Surface 29.5 -23.7
Water - 7.4 - 9.0
Underground Injection -39.6 - 4.7
Public Sewage -26.5 -11.9
Off-site -26.5 -22.3
TRI Total Releases
& Transfers -24.2 -11.5
Source: Office of Pollution Prevention and Toxics, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency,
EPA 745-R-93-003, 1991 Toxic Release Inventory: Public Data Release (1993).
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The table shows releases or transfers to different media and
facilities, measured in terms of millions of pounds. The most striking
feature of the table is the dramatic decline in emissions to all media.
Releases or transfers to all media declined by over 24 percent between
1989 and 1991. While there was a great deal of variation across media
and chemical classes, the general trend was downward for most
categories."' In the future, the TRI data will be a rich source of informa-
tion for building better emission inventories and identifying trends.
Economic Costs and Benefits
An ideal economic measure of the costs and benefits of regulation
would begin with the impact on individual welfare. Such measures are
not available for the universe of environmental laws and regulations
considered here, though some progress has been made in developing
more inclusive measures for selected environmental controls."'
The most complete information on the cost of environmental
regulation in the United States has been compiled by the EPA. It includes
both administrative costs as well as the direct costs of compliance borne
by businesses and individuals meeting EPA's major pollution control
laws."° It also includes expenditures at the local level for related
activities, such as trash collection. Table 5 shows the annualized cost of
meeting existing and new regulations for the years 1972 through 2000.
18. Office of Pollution Prevention and Toxics, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, EPA
745-R-93-003, 1991 Toxics Release Inventory: Public Data Release (1993).
19. For a critical discussion of different approaches for measuring the costs of regulation,
see RL Hahn & J. Hird, The Costs and Benefits of Regulation: Review and Synthesis, 8 Yale J.
Reg. 233, 239-247 (1991).
20. The costs do not include the impact of regulation on investment or innovation. For
examples of approaches that attempt to measure economy-wide impacts of environmental
regulations, see M. Hazilla & R. Kopp, The Social Cost of Environmental Quality Regulations;
A General Equilibrium Analysis, 98 J. Pol. Econ. 853 (1990). See also D. Jorgensen & P.
Wilcoxen, Environmental Regulation and U.S. Economic Growlth, 21 Rand J. Econ. 314 (1990).
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Table 5
TOTAL ANNUAL COSTS FOR EXISTING AND NEW REGULATIONS
(Millions of 1990 Dollars)
Year Existing New
Regulations Regulations
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
$30,600
$34,968
$38,842
$42,572
$48,038
$53,743
$58,334
$63,351
$66,985
$69,955
$70,762
$75,661
$80,801
$85,534
$92,259
$98,149
$100,150
$104,541
$107,857
$113,193
$117,694
$121,672
$125,364
$128,800
$132,206
$135,831
$139,458
$143,082
$146,674
$237
$407
$2,103
$4,403
$7,524
$10,705
$13,024
$14,463
$13,890
$15,708
$17,285
$18,951
$21,747
$22,617
$24,234
Total Percent Total
Annualized of GNP Costs
Costs, Excluding
Solid
Waste2
$30,600
$34,968
$38,842
$42,572
$48,038
$53,743
$58,334
$63,351
$66,985
$69,955
$70,762
$75,661
$80,801
$85,534
$92,496
$98,556
$102,253
$108,944
$115,380
$123,898
$130,718
$136,135
$139,254
$144,508
$149,491
$154,782
$161,205
$165,699
$170,908
0.9%
1.0%
1.1%
1.2%
1.3%
1.4%
1.4%
1.5%
1.6%
1.6%
1.7%
1.7%
1.7%
1.8%
1.9%
1.9%
1.9%
2.0%
2.1%
2.2%
2.3%
2.4%
2.4%
2.4%
2.5%
2.5%
2.6%
2.6%
2.6%
$20,852
$24,686
$28,040
$31,259
$36,033
$40,651
$44,560
$48,351
$51,256
$53,854
$55,742
$60,830
$64,748
$68,678
$74,358
$79,278
$83,240
$89,576
$95,475
$103,000
$109,055
$113,808
$116,277
$121,055
$125,519
$130,351
$136,316
$140,368
$145,138
'Costs are annualized at 7%.
2A large portion of solid waste expenditures is for garbage collection, which is not
traditionally counted as a regulatory cost.
Source: Office of Policy, Planning and Evaluation, U. S. Environmental Protection Agency,
EPA-230-11-90-083, Environmental Investments: The Cost of a Clean Environment (1990).
[Vol. 34
U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY
The time period 1972-1987 is based on actual cost data; the period
19882000 is based on extrapolations based on the past cost of regulations
and the estimated cost of new regulations.21 In 1993, the United States
spent about $140 billion on expenditures related to reducing pollution, or
about 2.4 percent of GNP. This is nearly half of what the United States
spent on national defense' The table reveals that there has been over
a three-fold increase in the cost of environmental regulation between 1972
and 1987, and this increase is projected to continue, with expenditures of
$171 billion projected in the year 2000. Environmental expenditures
continue to account for a larger share of GNP, moving from just under
1 percent in 1972 to just over 2 percent in 1990. By the year 2000,
environmental expenditures are expected to account for 2.6 percent of
GNP.
To better understand the impact of a statute or policy on the
economy, it is useful to combine specific estimates of economic costs and
benefits. Economists have attempted to measure the benefits of environ-
mental programs in a variety of ways, which can broadly be separated
into direct and indirect approaches.' The direct approach, known as
contingent valuation, asks individuals what they would be willing to pay
to have a cleaner environment. Thus, for example, in Los Angeles, an
individual might be shown two pictures, one on a day when the
mountains were not visible and one on a day when the mountains were
clearly visible. Then, an interviewer would ask the respondent to select
an increase in monthly electricity bill a person would be willing to pay
to have more days of improved visibility. A second approach to
measuring an individual's willingnesg to pay for different environmental
amenities uses indirect statistical techniques. For example, workers in
high-risk industries might receive higher wages than workers in
comparable jobs, but with lower risk. Using such data along with worker
characteristics, one can obtain a measure of the amount of compensation
required for workers to take jobs that pose greater safety or environmen-
tal risks. Another application of an indirect approach is to measure the
value of environmental amenities in a specific region by examining the
housing characteristics and prices, and estimating the fraction of the
housing price or rental price that is associated with living in a neighbor-
hood that has lower pollution. A third indirect approach attempts to
measure the demand for recreation by measuring the costs associated
21. Office of Policy, Planning and Evaluation, supra note 1.
22. This is based on an estimate of $294 billion for defense spending in 1993. See
Congressional Budget Office, The Economic and Budget Outlook: Fiscal Years 1994-1998
(Jan. 1993).
23. A. Freeman, Ill, The Benefits of Environmental Improvement: Theory and Practice
(1979).
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with different recreational activities, including travel costs and time costs.
Suffice it to say that none of these approaches are without their difficul-
ties, but they are among the few tools economists have to measure
economic benefits.
A large number of studies attempt to measure the benefits of
different aspects of pollution policy. Freeman reviews and synthesizes the
studies to derive some general estimates of the net benefits associated
with changes in air and water pollution policy.' For air pollution,
Freeman found that the overall benefits from reductions in air pollution
between 1970 and 1978 resulted in annual benefits of $8.9 to $93.1 billion
with a most likely value of $39.5 billion. Over three-fourths of the total
benefits were associated with health, measured in terms of fewer illnesses
and longer lives. The costs of air pollution control are estimated to be
$15.8 billion per year in 1978.25 Taking the difference between the
expected benefits and costs yields a net benefits in 1978 of about $24
billion. Freeman's analysis does not appear to factor in the impact of lead
reductions from 1970 to 1978. Based on more recent'benefit/cost analyses
for this pollutant, it would appear that adding in the benefits and costs
of lead over this time period would increase the net benefits of air
pollution reductions.' Freeman's calculation for air pollution does not
include data after 1978.3From Table 2, we see that benefits would have
increased substantially, due to reductions in all of the pollutants shown
in the table. In addition, overall benefits would have also increased
because population increased by 13 percent between 1978 and 1990.2
Assume, for the sake of argument, that benefits increased in proportion
to population growth, which yields a conservative estimate for expected
benefits in 1990 of $44.6 billion. Comparing this with the costs of $31.9
billion yields annual net benefits of about $13 billion in 1990. Thus, it
would appear that expected net benefits from air pollution policy were
positive over this time span.28
Some indication of the net benefits associated with new air
pollution regulations can be gleaned by an analysis of the benefits and
24. A. Freeman, Ill, Air and Water Pollution Control: A Benefit-Cost Assessment (1982).
25. Communications and Public Affairs, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 21K-1006,
Environmental Stewardship: EPA's First Two Years in the Bush Administration (1991).
26. Office of Policy Analysis, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Costs and Benefits
of Reducing Lead in Gasoline: Final Regulatory Impact Analysis (1988).
27. Council of Economic Advisers, supra note 2.
28. Given the uncertainties in developing the estimates, it is difficult to develop a
meaningful range for either of the two point estimates on net benefits. Combining the point
estimate of the costs for 1978 with the range of benefits estimates yields a range of $-6.9
billion to $77.3 billion for net benefits. For 1990, applying the same procedure yields a range
of $-21.8 billion to $73.3 billion for net benefits. Thus, it is unlikely that net benefits were
negative.
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costs associated with the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990. Portney
suggests that annual benefits associated with the amendments are likely
to range between $6 and $25 billion with a best guess of $14 billion. In
contrast, annual costs are in the range of $29 to $36 billion." Portney
does not provide a most likely estimate for costs. My own analysis
suggested that costs are likely to be about $30 billion.' Subtracting my
estimate from Portney's benefits estimate yields net costs of $16 billion.
Thus, the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments are expected to have a
deleterious effect on economic activity. Of course, there are substantial
uncertainties in these estimates, but on the basis of current scientific and
economic understanding of these issues, it would be fair to say that net
economic costs are likely to substantially exceed net economic benefits for
these amendments when they are fully implemented.3
For water pollution, Freeman estimates the benefits and costs
associated with implementation of the Federal Water Pollution Control
Act Amendments of 1972 along with subsequent amendments in 1977. On
the presumption that this Act achieved its objectives, Freeman argues that
the incremental benefits of meeting water quality objectives in 1985 were
between $6.9 and $33.5 billion annually, with a most likely estimate of
$17.1 billion. The costs of achieving water quality in 1985 were approxi-
mately $38.3 billion. Thus, based on this analysis, benefits from water
quality legislation fell short of costs by about $21 billion.32
This brief review of air and water programs suggests that these
programs are costly. In the case of air, legislation prior to 1990 appears
to have resulted in benefits that exceed costs. The new 1990 air legislation
appears to have net costs that far exceed benefits. In the case of water, the
costs of the program appear to have far exceeded the benefits. There are
significant limitations to such benefit-cost analyses. First of all, they only
cover a limited domain. They do not include the costs and benefits of
major laws and regulations covering hazardous waste sites, the use of
pesticides, the use of toxic substances, the use of chlorofluorocarbons and
29. P. Portney, Economics and the Clean Air Act, 4 J. Econ. Perspectives 173 (1990).
30. This crude estimate is based on work done while at the Council of Economic Advisers
in 1989. For the time period between 2001 and 2005, it assumes $5 billion for emission
controls for acid rain, $20 billion for smog reductions and $10 billion for air toxics
reductions. Note that the estimate falls within Portney's range. If the air toxics provisions
on residual risk call for risk reductions to 1 in I million, the costs would be substantially
higher than those estimated here. A plausible estimate of the additional costs would be $10
billion. See Denny Technical Services, Clean Air Legislation: Cost Evaluation (1990)
(prepared for the Business Roundtable, Raleigh, N.C., Jan. 8).
31. Note that in this case the range of benefit estimates provided by Portney is below the
point estimate for the costs. Thus, the likelihood that net benefits are negative is high.
32. Note that the upper end of the range on benefits is below the point estimate for costs,
suggesting that net benefits are likely to be negative.
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halons, and regulations specifically targeted aimed at protecting drinking
water. Thus, it would be premature to suggest we know enough to make
an informed assessment of the cost and benefits of environmental
regulation, even in economic terms. A second limitation is that the data
are subject to great uncertainties. For example, while the total benefits of
curbing acid rain in the current clean air legislation may have fallen short
of the costs, the range of uncertainty on the benefit estimates was
sufficiently large to justify almost any policy, even on narrow economic
grounds. Third, the analysis is global in the sense that it tries to compute
aggregate benefits across programs. It does not highlight which particular
programs and regulations confer significant net benefits and which are,
on net, quite costly. The latter information is relevant when decision-
makers have discretion over shaping individual regulations.
The preceding discussion summarized our understanding of the
overall economic costs and benefits of environmental regulation. Another
useful perspective emerges from analyzing the impact of specific
regulations. Table 6 lists selected environmental regulations along with
their cost-effectiveness, which is measured in cost per premature death
averted. The list is neither exhaustive, nor necessarily representative of
average environmental regulations. Moreover, one should not assume
that the numbers are directly comparable to each other because they often
use somewhat different measures of cost-effectiveness. For example, EPA
often treats a life that is extended for 1 year in the same way as a life that
is extended for 50 years. Notwithstanding these limitations, the informa-
tion in Table 6 illustrates two important points
First, the cost-effectiveness of individual regulations varies.
dramatically-ranging from hundreds of thousands to trillions of dollars.
This suggests that it would be possible to reduce environmental health
risks further by reallocating the resources from relative ineffective risk-
reduction technologies to more cost-effective strategies. Second, over time,
the cost per life saved of proposed rules for environmental protection has
tended to increase. This is largely because most of the known environ-
mental health risks have been reduced to very low levels in the United
States; thus, making further reductions quite expensive.'
, 3
33. Telephone interview with A. Fraas, Office of Management and Budget (Nov. 22,1991).
34. Strictly speaking, one would need to see the entire universe of environmental
regulations to make such a statement. Yet, it appears to be consistent with the data and is
also supported by other evidence. See A. Fraas, The Role of Economic Analysis in Shaping
Environmental Policy, 54 Law & Contemp. Probs. 113 (1991).
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Table 6
COST-EFFECTIVENESS
OF SELECTED ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION AGENCY REGULATIONS
Cost per
Year Premature
Regulation' Issued Death Averted2
Trihalomethane Drinking Water Standards 1979 $0.2
Cover/Move Uranium Mill Tailings (Inactive Sites) 1983 $31.7
Cover/Move Uranium Mill Tailings (Active Sites) 1983 $45.0
Standards for Radionuclides in Uranium Mines3  1984 $3.4
Benzene NESHAP (Original: Fugitive Emissions) 1984 $3.4
Arsenic Emission Standards for Glass Plants 1986 $13.5
Arsenic/Copper NESHAP 1986 $23.0
Benzene NESHAP (Revised: Coke By-Products 1988 $6.1
Hazardous Waste Land Disposal
Ban (1st 3rd) 1988 $4,190.4
Municipal Solid Waste Landfill
Standards (Proposed) 1988 $19,107.0
Asbestos Ban 1989 $110.7
Hazardous Waste Listing for Petroleum
Refining Sludge 1990 $27.6
Benzene NESHAP (Revised: Transfer Operations) 1990 $32.9
Benzene NESHAP (Revised: Waste Operations) 1990 $168.2
Hazardous Waste Listing for Wood
Preserving Chemicals 1990 $5,700,000.0
Ethylene Dibromide Drinking Water Standard 1991 $5.7
1,2 - Dichloropropane Drinking Water Standard 1991 $653.0
Atrazine / Alachlor Drinking Water Standard 1991 $92,069.7
'70-year lifetime exposure assumed unless otherwise specified.
'In millions of 1990 dollars.
145-year lifetime exposure
Source Office of Management and Budget, Budget for the United States Government, Fiscal
Year 1992 (1991).
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Understanding the Policy Process
A critical challenge in explaining past environmental policy
outputs is to identify the political forces that gave rise to these outputs
along with key patterns that have emerged.' First, the key political
forces are identified. Then some key patterns in United States regulation
are examined. This analysis helps set the stage for evaluating the Bush
Administration's environmental agenda and the future of environmental
policy in the United States
There are four forces that are critical in shaping the evolution of
environmental policy in the United States. They are: (1) the development
of the environmental movement; (2) the evolution of industry; (3) the
maturation of EPA; and (4) the increased demand for environmental
quality on the part of the electorate. This list is noteworthy for what is
present as well as what is absent-most notably the Congress, the
Administration and the Courts. Clearly, all of these institutions, and
particularly Congress, have played an important role in shaping policy. 6
Over the long run (i.e., decades), I see these actors as responding to the
will of the electorate and the concerns of special interests. Indeed, one
could make a similar argument for EPA as well, but I prefer to view EPA
as a special interest with its own agenda.'
The maturation of the environmental movement is seen in the
dramatic increase in the number, size and contributions to environmental
organizations over the last twenty years.8 It is also seen in the ability
of environmental groups to use the media and the Congress to achieve
their goals. Environmental organizations can be understood in relatively
35. For a more in-depth discussion of these issues, see E. D. Elliott et al., Toard a Theory
of Statutory Evolution: The Federalization of Environmental Law, 1 J. Law, Econ. & Org. 313
(1985); R. Hahn, supra note 11; R. Paehlke, Environmentalism and the Future of Progressive
Politics (1989); B. Yandle, The Political Limits of Environmental Regulation (1989); M. Landylet al., The Environmental Protection Agency: Asking the Wrong Questions (1990); M. Kraft
& N. Vig, supra note 14.
36. For an insightful and provocative discussion of how these institutions interact to
shape policy, see M. McCubbins, R. Noll & B. Weingast, Adninistrative Procedures as histru-
ments of Political Control, 3 J. Law, Econ. & Org. 243 (1988).
37. Politicians obviously have their own agendas as well. In the past, such agendas have
had an important impact on environmental policy. For example, both Senator Muskie and
President Nixon had an important impact on shaping the Environmental Protection Agency.
Since that time, one could point to several politicians who have seized opportunities to
promote environmental initiatives and shape legislation. By not including them as
fundamental forces, I do not mean to suggest that these individuals do not make a
difference. Rather, it reflects my personal preference to focus on underlying interest groups
rather than specific individuals as explanations for how policy evolves over the longer term.
38. R. Mitchell et al., Twenty Years of Enviromnental Mobilization: Trends Anmong National
Environmental Organizations, 4 Soc. & Nat. Resources 219 (1991).
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simple, and some might say, crass terms. These organizations have an
interest in sensationalizing environmental issues, so that public opinion
can be mobilized in support of the environmental movement, so that their
organizations can survive and flourish. This is not to suggest that there
are not important differences between environmental organizations, just
as there are important differences among businesses. For example, the
Environmental Defense Fund has come out in support of environmental
markets to control pollution, while the Natural Resources Defense
Council is still backing centralized "command-and-control" approaches
as the principle method for improving the environment.
Environmental organizations are lobbyists for a particular point
of view, and there is a strong element of self-interest in the positions they
take. For example, environmental organizations rarely suggest that we are
spending too much money on a particular environmental effort. Instead,
the environmental groups generally accuse the government and industry
of foot-dragging. These groups are not particularly interested in a
balanced assessment of the science underlying environmental policy.
They are interested in persuading the public that more money should be
spent on the environment and environmental groups.
A critical feature in the maturation of the environmental
movement over time is specialization, both within and across organiza-
tions. As the sheer number of statutes has grown, and the nature of
regulation has become more complex, environmental groups have had to
specialize both internally and externally. The causation is, of course, not
one way. Indeed, to some extent environmentalists have been responsible
for the increase in legislative and .regulatory activity.
A second feature in the maturation of the environmental
movement is that it is beginning to speak with more than one voice on
important policy issues. While the movement recognizes the public value
of developing consensus positions, the competition among environmental
groups is intense. This competition encourages groups to "product
differentiate" so that they can claim to provide a unique and valuable
service to their supporters. In the future, we can expect to see a wider
range of environmentalist positions on issues as competition for financial
39. Command-and-control refers to a regulatory approach in which the regulator specifies
a particular technology or performance standard that the regulated party must adopt.
Command-and-control is typically thought to be an inefficient method of regulation relative
to regulatory systems that provide firms with greater flexibility in achieving goals, such as
marketable permits and taxes. For example, the market-based proposal to curb emissions
that cause acid rain could save as much as $1 billion annually over traditional command-
and-control approaches, which would require selected power plants to install costly
scrubbers. See R. Hahn & R. Stavins, Incentives for Environmental Protection: Integrating Theory
and Practice, 82 Am. Econ. Rev. 464 (1992), for an assessment of the strengths and limitations
of this argument.
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support increases. I think this is a healthy departure from the past, when
there was a fairly consistent "party" line, since it is not obvious what
approaches are best suited for specific problems or which problems are
most important to attack first. The competition is likely to take place
more over the means for achieving objectives rather than the objectives
themselves. Environmentalists will continue to adhere to the rhetoric that
zero pollution should be the appropriate goal of policy.
A second force affecting the nature of the environmental debate
is industry. Like the environmental movement, industry has also
undergone a maturation process, but of a slightly different kind. In 1970,
industry had quite a bit of leeway to adopt whatever environmental
policies it wanted. It faced very little resistance because there was not a
well-organized environmental movement.
Two decades later, the tables have turned. A new corporate
consciousness is emerging." Recycling and pollution prevention are now
politically correct. This change in consciousness has been caused by three
factors: first, there is a keen awareness that environmental costs are likely
to represent a larger and larger fraction of a company's bottom line.
Second, there is a growing awareness that consumer preferences towards
the environment and "greener" products makes it in the interest of
corporations to develop a new, greener image. Finally, an old generation
of managers is gradually being replaced by a new generation of
managers, who are more sensitive to environmental issues and who
recognize that environmental management is an integral part of doing
business.
Despite these changes within industry, it is still motivated by a
strong sense of self interest. The 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments
provide a case in point. The major oil companies were interested in
preserving their market share for gasoline; the farm lobby strove to
extend the subsidy for ethanol and mandate that ethanol be used as a
pollution control strategy in certain carbon monoxide non-attainment
areas; the natural gas producers tried to insert legislative language that
would ensure that natural gas was used in fleets of vehicles; the
methanol lobby tried to insert language that would make methanol look
favorable in comparison with gasoline; the steel companies succeeded in
providing getting special treatment for coke ovens in regulations
governing air toxic emissions; and the auto manufacturers tried unsuc-
cessfully to ensure that they would not have to add additional equipment
to control evaporative emissions. All of this is business-as-usual as these
40. See, for example, Cairncross, supra note 7.
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industries try to enhance their bottom line, and jockey for position within
their industry."
A third force, which is critical to understanding the shape of
environmental policy, is the EPA.42 Like environmental organizations,
EPA has grown and become more specialized, largely as a result of the
steady stream of environmental laws. Table 7 shows the growth in EPA
staff and budget over time. There has been roughly a four-fold increase
in staff since 1970.
Spending has increased from $205 million in 1970 to over $4
billion in 1992, measured in current year dollars. Like environmental
organizations, EPA recognizes the key to its continued growth lies in
expanding the list of environmental issues that need attention, and
writing regulations in such a way as to provide a greater need for EPA's
services. EPA has a critical advantage over all of the other actors on the
inside of the policy game, most notably Congress and the Administration.
EPA is the principal repository for "factual" information about the
environment. Congress and the Administration rely very heavily on EPA
as a source of information. By using its critical position in analyzing and
disseminating information among government policy elites, EPA is able
to move regulations and laws in the direction its staff prefers.
In the late 1970s, under Administrator Douglas Costle, EPA began
to highlight the importance of implementing pollution controls to protect
human health. It now has become apparent that such risks, at least those
causing cancer, are likely to be relatively small.43 Moreover, those health
risks that remain are from sources that are more difficult to control or
monitor. For example, "non-point" sources of pollution, such as pesticide
run-off into streams, is by its nature difficult to monitor and control. The
Agency is still trying to address these remaining risks, but it is also
turning its attention to other issues related to the management of
ecological systems.' While many of these concerns may be justified on
the basis of the science, they are also consistent with the interest of the
bureaucracy in expanding its influence over corporations and the lives of
ordinary individuals.45
41. Businesses may use environmental regulation as a way of imposing higher costs on
other firms within the same industry or potential entrants to that industry. Thus, for
example, some large biotechnology firms might support regulations that require additional
paperwork or testing if such regulations put smaller firms at a competitive disadvantage.
See generally M. Maloney & R. McCormick, A Positive Theory of Environmental Quality
Regulation, 25 J. Law & Econ. 99 (1982).
42. A. Marcus, Environmental Protection Agency, in The Politics of Regulation U. Wilson ed.,
1980).
43. Doll & Peto, supra note 3.
44. M. Greve, The EPA Rediscovers the Enviromnent, 2 Am. Enterprise 52 (Nov./Dec. 1991).
45. F. Blake, The Politics of the Environment: Does Washington Know Best?, 1 Am. Enterprise
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Table 7
STAFFING AND BUDGET AT THE
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY'
Year Staffing Costs
(Permanent (Millions of
Full-Time Dollars in
Positions) Obligations)
1970 4,093 $ 205
1975 10,440 $ 794
1980 13,045 $1,360
1981 12,720 $1,345
1982 11,402 $1,363
1983 10,940 $1,324
1984 11,562 $1,639
1985 12,590 $1,928
1986 13,115 $1,860
1987 13,649 $2,642
1988 14,078 $3,109
1989 14,539 $3,309
1990 15,587 $3,594
1991 16,241 $3,979
1992 16,874 $4,411
19932 17,495 $4,413
19942 17,276 $4,213
'All costs are in current year dollars. Figures are based on fiscal years. Construction grants
are excluded from the calculation of the regulatory expenditures and staffing at the U.S.
EPA.
2Estimated.
Source: M. Warren & J. Lis, Regulatory Standstill: Analysis of the 1993 Federal Budget (June
1992) (Wash. U., Center for the Study of Am. Bus., Occasional Paper No. 105).
6 (Mar./Apr. 1990).
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A final force, which will probably be the most important in
shaping environmental policy in the future, is the apparent increase in
demand on the part of the public for a cleaner environment.' While
this demand is difficult to measure, polling data suggests that the public
ranks the environment as one of the critical issues that it wants politicians
to address. Some have argued that this increase in demand takes the form
of a new environmental ethic or consciousness.47 The increase in
demand has had some noticeable consequences. There is a greater
concern with global issues such as climate change, sustainable develop-
ment, and stratospheric ozone depletion. This is driven, in part, by
science, but public perceptions also play a critical role. People are
becoming increasingly concerned about how man's activity relates to the
health of the planet. Boulding argued that the appropriate metaphor is to
think of the earth as a spaceship, which has a limited assimilative
capacity." Related to these concerns, there is increasing reluctance on the
part of individuals to live near landfills that contain hazardous and
nonhazardous waste. The NIMBY problem, or "not-in-my-back-yard"
syndrome, is a political hot potato. For example, states are becoming
more concerned about receiving wastes from other states, even when that
waste is disposed of using the best available procedures that are thought
to impose minimal risk. Similar concerns are arising worldwide related
to the shipment of waste across national boundaries. Indeed, one could
argue that we are in the process of experiencing the internationalization
of environmental regulation.49
We are now running a large-scale natural experiment in
environmental policy. Politicians, driven largely by NIMBY-mania,
continue to limit the ways waste can be legally handled. As Tarr notes in
an insightful essay, history is replete with efforts, usually unsuccessful,
at finding the "ultimate sink" for wastes.' Now, we are slowly and
awkwardly moving towards a political reality in which no sink is
acceptable. In the United States, it is becoming more difficult and
expensive to dispose of hazardous wastes on land; the incineration of
such wastes has been banned at sea; and it is becoming more difficult to
46. R. Mitchell, Public Opinion and the Green Lobby: Poised for the 1990s?, in Environmental
Policy in the 1990s: Toward a New Agenda (M. Kraft & N. Vig eds., 1990).
47. Paehlke, supra note 35; P. Portney, Overall Assessment and Future Directions, in Public
Policies for Environmental Protection (P. Portney ed., 1990).
48. K. Boulding, The Economics of the Coming Spaceship Earth, in Environmental Quality in
a Growing Economy (H. Jarrett ed., 1966).
49.R. Hahn & K. Richards, The hiternationalization of Envirownental Regulation, 30 Harv. Int'l
L.J. 421 (1989).
50. J. Tarr, The Search for the Ultimate Sink: Urban Air, Land and Water Pollution in Historical
Perspective, in Environmental History: Critical Issues in Comparative Perspective (K. Bailes
ed., 1985).
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site incinerators that would burn the waste. The result, perhaps some-
what unintentional, is a kind of pollution prevention policy, where good
corporate actors are searching desperately for ways to reduce waste,
while others are availing themselves of less desirable methods, sometimes
illegal.51
Policy Themes
There are two pervasive themes in the development of federal
environmental legislation. One relates to the limited utilization of
standard welfare economics in the selection of environmental goals and
instruments. A second relates to the tendency of politicians to avoid
placing blame for environmental problems on voters or consumers;
moreover, politicians are also reluctant to ask voters directly to shoulder
the burden of cleaning up the environment.
The limited application of economic principles can be attributed
to the fact that there is no strong political lobby for economic efficiency.
Indeed, as shown in Table 8, many of the laws allow only limited kinds
of trade offs in developing regulations.
The two principal exceptions involve the screening of toxic
chemicals under the Toxic Substances Control Act, and the screening of
pesticides under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act.
Both of these statutes allow for the balancing of economic costs and
benefits. In meeting the primary and secondary standards for air
pollution and meeting water quality goals, no such trade offs are allowed.
Thus, economic analysis that uses conventional cost-benefit analysis is not
permissible. Even cost-effectiveness analysis, which takes the goal as
given, and strives to identify policies that would achieve the goal using
the fewest resources, is rarely applied. A number of the statutes allow
such analysis, but outside of the Office of Management and Budget and
the Council of Economic Advisers, there is not a strong constituency
aimed at furthering such policies.
51. Examples range from the mundane oil change by an individual who puts the used
oil down the sewer to the more exotic "midnight dumping" that results from an unwilling-
ness to pay the cost of legally disposing of wastes.
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Industry would like to see greater application of cost-benefit
analysis, but environmental groups are reluctant because they believe
greater application of this tool would result in relaxing of some environ-
mental standards. 2 Moreover, environmental organizations (with the
exception of the Environmental Defense Fund) continue to prefer using
"command-and-control" approaches as opposed to market-based ap-
proaches for addressing environmental issues.' In some cases, environ-
mentalists and industry have settled on policies that may actually have
had adverse effects on the environment. Legislation that controls new
sources, such as automobiles and power plants, provides some interesting
cases. By requiring new power plants to install costly scrubbers, the 1977
Clean Air Act amendments provided a powerful incentive to extend the
life of existing power plants that pollute more than new plants.'
Automobile regulations provided a similar incentive for owners of old
cars to hold onto their vehicles longer.5
To address the wave of regulatory activity that began in the late
1960s, all presidents, beginning with President Nixon, introduced
regulatory oversight mechanisms with varying degrees of success.5%
Perhaps the most controversial of these was Executive Order 12291,
signed by President Reagan, which called for performing a cost-benefit
analysis for "major" rules. Major rules were generally those that imposed
costs in excess of $100 million per year or were likely to have significant
economic impacts. Agencies were asked to show that their proposed rule
maximized net benefits to the extent permitted by law. The success of this
oversight mechanism is largely in the eyes of the beholder. Those
lobbyists for efficiency would define success in terms of the extent to
52. Environmentalists threatened to oppose the elevation of the EPA Administrator to a
Cabinet Secretary if the Secretary were required to consider the balancing of costs and
benefits in rule making.
53. Some other environmental groups are now beginning to pay lip service to supporting
marketable permits. In addition, others are beginning to support green taxes, especially
when some of those taxes will be used to support the activities of environmental groups.
The point is that we are beginning to see some movement on the part of these groups. See,
for example, M. Kriz; Their Turn, Nat'l J., Feb. 13, 1993, at 388-91. Such movement is also
reflected in R. Stavins & T. Grumbly, The Greening of the Market: Making tile Polluter Pay, in
Mandate For Change (W. Marshall & M. Schram eds., 1993).
54. B. Ackerman & W. Hassler, Clean Coal/Dirty Air. Or How the Clean Air Act became
a Multibillion-Dollar Bail-Out for High-Sulfur Coal Producers and What Should be Done
About It (1981).
55. H. Gruenspecht, Differential Regulation: The Case of Auto Emission Standards, 72 Am.
Econ. Rev. 328 (May 1982).
56. C. DeMuth & D. Ginsburg, White House Review of Agency Rulemaking, 99 Harv. L. Rev.
1075 (1986).; Fraas, supra note 34; K. Viscusi, The Mis-Specified Agenda: The 1980's Reforms
in Health, Safety, and Environmental Regulation (Sept. 11, 1990) (on file with Duke
University).
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which rulemakings were more economically efficient. On the other hand,
some would argue that this administrative oversight is inappropriate
because it is designed to undermine the intent of Congress.57 In my
view, the impact of this regulatory oversight has been modest. The
review process probably had its greatest impact during the first term of
the Reagan Administration, and its impact has declined considerably
since that time.'
Sbme information on the regulatory review process between 1981-
1991 is provided in Table 9.
The table illustrates three points: First, there is a large variation
in the present value cost of rules over time, partially reflecting the normal
ebb and flow of legislative requirements. Second, to the extent there is a
trend, it appears that the cost of rules that passed in a given year in the
last few years is higher than the first few years. Third, the latter part of
the eighties showed a marked increase in the number of proposed and
final major rules. The data suggest that environmental regulation is
expanding. Moreover, it is worth noting that the primary trend appears
in the second term of the Reagan Administration, thus casting doubt on
the extent to which a president can make lasting changes in environmen-
tal regulation. The trend toward increased spending and regulation is
likely to continue, unless there are substantial changes made in the
regulatory oversight process both at the White House level and within
EPA.
57. A. Morrison, OMB Interference with Agency Ruleinaking: The Wrong Way to Write a
Regulation, 99 Harv. L. Rev. 1059 (1986).
58. It is very difficult to measure the impact of regulatory oversight. For a discussion of
these issues, see Environmental Policy under Reagan's Executive Order: The Role of Cost-
Benefit Analysis (V. Smith ed., 1984); Fraas, supra note 34; R. Hahn, Regulation: Past, Present
and Future, 13 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 167 (1990).
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Table 9
SUMMARY OF ACTION
ON MAJOR EPA RULES, 1981-1991
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991
3 5 5 8 12 6 21 18 12 21 41
Present Value na 2 2
Cost of Major
Final Rules
(Billions of 1990 dollars)
0 20 2 22 91 7 18 48'
Number of
Proposed
and Final
Major Rules
'Estimated by author.
Sources: A. Fraas, The Role of Economic Analysis in Shaping Environmental Policy, 54 Law &
Contemp. Probs. 113 (1991); Telephone interview with A. Fraas (Nov. 22, 1991).
[Vol. 34
US. ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY
A second important pattern in environmental legislation is the
.tendency to avoid placing any blame or responsibility for environmental
problems on voters. The reason is relatively straightforward. If voters
believe that they can have a clean environment without having to incur
the costs, they will be more likely to want it. Thus, Congress passes
inefficient mileage standards for cars as a way of trying to reduce fuel
consumption. Similarly, auto manufacturers and oil companies are
primarily blamed for vehicle pollution without putting any responsibility
on the driver. Only as a last resort are drivers asked to participate in
limiting emissions by participating in inspection and maintenance
programs. Economists will tell you that a good way to reduce energy
consumption or pollution is to impose an emission tax or a pollution fee.
It is good in the sense that it can attain a particular objective at a lower
cost than other alternatives, such as Corporate Average Fuel Economy
Standards or command-and-control regulation. It is bad, from the
standpoint of politicians and bureaucrats, in the sense that it makes the
costs of the objective more visible to the electorate, and thus places
politicians who advocate such proposals at greater risk.
Congress and environmental interest groups perpetuate the myth
that there are good guys and bad guys in the environmental protection
game. The bad guys, not surprisingly, turn out to be the industrialists,
who are incorrectly blamed for most of society's environmental ills.
Would that the truth were that simple! In reality, special interests
influence legislators, Congress produces special interest legislation, and
policy moves forward in fits and starts.5
In summary, the key forces that are driving environmental policy
are changing. Politicians and bureaucrats can be expected to respond to
these changes. At the same time, there have been some important themes
in environmental policy that have remained constant over the last twenty
years. Noteworthy among these are the propensity to pretend that people
do not cause pollution and that economics is not particularly relevant in
selecting among environmental policy options.
3. ENTER: THE "ENVIRONMENTAL" PRESIDENT
President Bush did not need an environmental movement to
remind him that the environment is an important spiritual and economic
59. Special interests do not always win, a case in point being airline deregulation. See, for
example, M. Levine, Revisionism Revised? Airline Deregulation and the Public Interest, 44 Law
& Contemp. Probs. 179 (1981). But much of environmental politics can be explained in terms
of a standard interest group paradigm, where environmental groups are a potent force. See
generally R. Hahn, The Political Economy of Environmental Regulation: Towards a Unifying
Framework, 65 Pub. Choice 21 (1990).
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resource. An avid hunter and fisherman, he appreciated the need to
develop a strong economy in harmony with the environment. Indeed, as
Vice President, he participated in several regulatory decisions, such as the
phasedown of lead in gasoline, that made sense from both an environ-
mental and an economic perspective.
Bush's deep commitment to the environment was reflected, in
part, in his political choice to head the EPA-William Reilly. Reilly has
been a very effective spokesman for the environment and has helped
bring some credibility to the Republican party on environmental issues.
The political dimensions of the environmental movement have
not been lost on the Republican party. Bush was able to turn Boston
Harbor into a Republican tea party with serious repercussions for the
Dukakis campaign. He was less successful in using the environment as
an issue against then-Governor Clinton. While in office, President Bush
staked out aggressive policies in a number of environmental areas,
including the phase out of chlorofluorocarbons by the end of the century,
clean air, and reforestation. On the other hand, his administration was
criticized for failing to take more aggressive stands on a number of
issues, including global climate change.
This section critically evaluates the shape of Bush's environmental
agenda. Making such an evaluation requires defining a benchmark
against which to judge the Administration's environmental policy
initiatives. The benchmark selected here is a hypothetical Democratic
Administration. My objective is to identify themes that are likely to affect
the evolution of environmental policy over the next two decades.
The Bush Administration released several publications summariz-
ing its environmental accomplishments. 60 Table 10 provides an over-
view of environmental initiatives during the Bush Presidency.
Undoubtedly, the crowning environmental achievement of the
Bush Administration was the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments. President
Bush helped break the logjam on revising the 1977 Clean Air Act
Amendments. Since passage of the Act, the EPA and the Bush White
House had a number of discussions on how best to implement the
provisions. In addition, EPA was busily introducing voluntary programs
to reduce energy usage and toxic emissions, initiating environmental
programs in Eastern Europe, phasing out the use of chlorofluorocarbons,
and supporting tree-planting initiatives.
60. See, for example, Council on Environmental Quality, supra note 6; Communications and
Public Affairs, supra note 25.
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Table 10
ENVIRONMENTAL ACHIEVEMENTS AS SEEN BY THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION
Clean Air Act Amendments of
1990
Pollution Prevention Act of 1990
Basel Convention on the Trans-
boundary Movement of Waste
signed March 1990
National Estuary Program April
1990
Stratospheric Ozone Protection
agreement by Montreal Protocol
members in June 1990
Global Forest Agreement of July
1990
Oil Pollution Act of August 1990
Environmental Education Act
November 1990
Green Lights Program January
1991
Debt-for-Nature Swaps
Tree Planting
Enforcement Results
Recycling Efforts Redoubled
Toxic Releases Cut
Climate Change Research
Eastern Europe
EPA Cabinet Status
Green Fund
" Substantially reduces toxic air emissions and emissions
causing acid rain and smog; established market-based
approach for reducing acid rain
" Establishes pollution prevention hierarchy: prevent or
reduce at the source, recycle, treat, dispose or release
into the environment only as a last resort
" Eighty-country treaty requires notice of proposed
hazardous waste shipments and prior written consent
• Adds five areas to the EPA's estuary program
" Phase out CFCs and other substances depleting ozone
layer by 2000
" Research, training, and technical assistance for both
temperate and tropical rain forests
" EPA and U.S. Coast Guard in charge of implementing
this law; improves federal and state preparedness for
oil spills; sets strict liabilities for cleanup costs;
expands oil pollution research and development
• Establishes non-profit education and training
foundation funded by government grants and gifts
" Designed to save electricity and reduce pollution;
voluntary program with major U.S. corporations to
encourage the use of lighting designs and technologies
that are energy efficient and profitable
" To strengthen economies and long-term conservation
efforts in Latin America and the Caribbean; debt
forgiveness in exchange for environmental initiatives
• Proposed reforestation program to plant one billion
trees per year across America; will help displace
carbon dioxide in the air and improve water and air
quality
" Set new records for civil penalties, environmental
convictions, and prison sentences
" Communities striving for EPA goal of 25% recycling of
municipal solid waste by 1992
" EPA launched voluntary reductions program with
industry
" Increased investments from $9.6 million in 1989 to $15
million in 1990
" Provided assistance to Poland and East European
Environmental Center
" Proposed legislation to create a U.S. Department of
the Environment
" Provided $150 million to the World Bank Global
Environment facility
Sources: U. S. Envfironmental Protection Agency, Envfironmental Stewardships EPA s First Two
Years in the Bush Administration (Communications and Public Affairs, 21K-1006, 1991),
Council on Environmental Quality, The view from CEA: A collection of CEQ clips, Speaches
and other current information (Sept. 30, 1991).
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What are we to make of this menu of initiatives? I have construct-
ed a relatively simple taxonomy that consists of "major themes," "sub-
themes" and "non-themes". Major themes correspond to what I see as
major initiatives by the Bush Administration that represented important
departures from the past and that, arguably, would not have been central
in a Democratic administration. "Sub-themes" are also new and different,
but less important in terms of how they affect the policy process. Finally,
"non-themes" reflect what would have been business as usual. These
non-themes are largely driven by the evolving forces discussed in the
preceding section.
There are two major themes in environmental policy in the Bush
Administration. The first is the promotion of market-based approaches to
environmental control. By implementing a market-based approach for
limiting emissions that cause acid rain, President Bush made it clear that
he was interested in pursuing regulatory alternatives to command-and-
control that would save money in achieving environmental quality
objectives. Not only did the President spend a considerable amount of
time promoting this innovative approach to environmental control, but
so did his key advisors on these issues: Administrator William Reilly,
White House Counsel C. Boyden Gray and Michael Boskin, Chairman of
the Council of Economic Advisers. These people argued persuasively that
command-and-control regulation should only be used as a last resort, and
that industry should be allowed to have more flexibility in achieving
environmental goals.
While the Bush Administration deserved high marks for
developing a serious dialogue about market-based instruments in the
policy arena, it failed to engage in a similar discussion about the
appropriate goals of environmental policy. In fairness to the Bush
Administration, no previous Administration had been willing to promote
a serious dialogue about goals either. The rise of the environmental
movement makes such a dialogue too costly in political terms. Political
arguments in favor of market-based approaches to environmental
protection rarely question the goal for which the instrument is being
designed. Designing a slick instrument to achieve an undesirable goal is
like taking a fast train to the wrong station. Some recent proposals for
markets that have emerged from EPA have this flavor. Examples include
proposals to use markets to meet arbitrary recycling targets for newspa-
pers and a statute endorsing the use of a market in oxygenate credits,
which would effectively subsidize ethanol.
The second major theme of the Bush Administration is closely
related to the first theme, but has very different policy implications. The
essence of the theme is embodied in the following quote from President
Bush:
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To those who suggest we're only trying to balance economic
growth and environmental protection, I say they miss the
point. We are calling for an entirely new way of thinking to
achieve both while compromising neither.'1
In this quote, President Bush echoes a theme that pervades the
thinking within the upper echelons of the Environmental Protection
Agency. He suggests that it is, indeed, possible to make substantial
progress in improving the environment while the economy continues to
grow, perhaps at a faster rate than it would have in the absence of new
environmental initiatives. In short, the American people can have their
cake and eat it, too, if they apply more Yankee ingenuity to environmen-
tal problem solving. While this argument has some credibility, it has
serious limitations if taken to an extreme. The Bush Administration may
have been guilty of taking the argument to the extreme. This philosophy
is exemplified in the "voluntary" reduction programs which EPA has
initiated for reducing toxic releases and for saving electricity by
introducing more energy efficient technologies. Make no mistake about
it. Some companies may save money by participating in these programs,
but the majority participate either because they have their arms twisted
or because they place a relative high value on being seen as "green". For
example, Monsanto's "voluntary" cutbacks of their toxic releases were not
done because they would save money; nor were they done because they
posed substantial health risks. They were done because they provide a
value to the firm in terms of improving employee morale, recruitment
opportunities and public image.
The Pollution Prevention Act of 1990 is an excellent example of
how philosophical views on the environment can adversely affect the
economy. The Act is important not so much because of its immediate
impact, but because of what it suggests for the shape of future legislation.
This Act creates a hierarchy for addressing pollution. The best approach
is to prevent pollution; the second best is to recycle residuals safely; the
third best is to treat pollution; the worst is to dispose of residuals without
treatment.' What is remarkable about this paradigm is that there is no
mention of economics; nor is there any analysis suggesting why this
hierarchy is necessarily better for the environment. We are simply asked
to believe in the primacy of pollution prevention; yet, if pollution
prevention costs a great deal more than safe disposal, and society
vigorously pursues a prevention-first strategy, there may be fewer
resources available for much-needed environmental improvements, such
61. See C. B. Gray & D. Rivkin, A 'No Regrets' Environmental Policy, 83 Foreign Pol'y 47,
60 (1991) (citing quote from statement of the President on Apr. 18, 1990).
62. Communications and Public Affairs, snpra note 25.
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as saving the Chesapeake Bay. The point again is that pollution preven-
tion is not free; it is probably a good idea in some instances and a bad
one in others. Adopting it as the method of choice without reference to
overall environmental and economic consequences is foolhardy.
This free-lunch philosophy also conveniently overlooks the fact
that the majority of regulation that comes out of EPA is your run of the
mill command-and-control regulation. It continues to ignore the fact that
such regulations are becoming increasingly costly and doing less and less
to reduce risks to humans. In short, this theme, while appealing, may
lead to public policies that are misguided.' We must accept the fact that
many policies aimed at improving the environment will adversely affect
economic growth and consumption as we now define it. There is nothing
necessarily wrong with this. Indeed, it may be desirable to change our
pattern of consumption and our view of man's relationship to the
planet." Merits of these changes notwithstanding, we should recognize
what we are doing, and not hide behind the largely impoverished
rhetoric of win-win situations for the economy and the environment.'
While these two themes are major, Administrator Reilly highlight-
ed two other important sub-themes. First, Reilly argued that we should
use science in thinking through environmental problems.6 While not
a particularly radical idea, it is one that is sometimes overlooked in the
environmental regulatory process. EPA's program offices often use
studies that are not subjected to scientific peer review, and these same
offices often present worst-case analyses to try to make their case for
more regulation. The Agency has instituted a "Total Quality Manage-
ment" process aimed at improving the quality of information. In addition,
Administrator Reilly established an environmental economics subcommit-
tee of the Science Advisory Board. Whether the focus on quality will
work is debatable, since agency performance is difficult to measure.
A second important sub-theme that was promoted enthusiastical-
ly by Administrator Reilly was the application of state-of-the art risk
assessment measures to evaluate the ecological and health risks posed by
different environmental problems.' This effort builds upon a project
63. For an insightful critique of command-and-control that highlights how this approach
can impede innovation, see M. Ridley, How to Smother hinovation, Wall St. J., June 9, 1993,
at A12.
64. W. Reilly, The Green Thumb of Capitalism: The Enviromuental Benefits of Sustainable
Growth, 54 Pol'y Rev. 16 (1990).
65. For an alternative to the win-win rhetoric, which highlights the potential role for
policy analysis, see R. Hahn, Toward a New Environtnental Paradign, 102 Yale L.J. 1719, 1750-
54 (May 1993).
66. W. Reilly, Facing Facts on the Environmnent, Wash. Post, Aug, 20, 1991.
67. Science Advisory Board, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, SAB-EC-90-021,
Reducing Risk: Setting Priorities and Strategies for Environmental Protection (1990).
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completed in the second term of the Reagan Administration.s While
such efforts are laudable, it is unclear where they will lead. Mr. Reilly
took some positive steps in explaining to the public that society may be
better off by not acting in some cases-asbestos in schools being a notable
example. Unfortunately, integrating the risk assessment exercises into the
policy process is virtually impossible. Programs involving the clean up
of hazardous waste have taken on a life of their own that is largely
driven by the public's fears rather than what is known about these
risks.'
Turning to non-themes, undoubtedly the most important for
consumers is the escalation in pollution control costs, induced by the
steady flow of environmental regulations. Brookes argued that the
absence of OMB's regulatory branch in most high-level environmental
decisions, particularly in the early part of the Bush presidency, did not
bode well for keeping the lid on regulatory costs.' An EPA that is
subject to minimal executive oversight will feel less pressure to justify its
rules in terms of costs and environmental benefits. To some extent, the
Competitiveness Council has attempted to oversee EPA, but this body
was simply not in a position to seriously evaluate the steady stream of
regulations that EPA develops." Indeed, even OMB is incapable of
doing this task very well. The appropriate place to perform such
68. Office of Policy Analysis & Office of Policy, Planning and Evaluation, U.S. Environ-
mental Protection Agency, Overview Report, Unfinished Business: A Comparative
Assessment of Environmental Problems (1987).
69. In fairness to the public, the state of our knowledge about many of these risks is poor.
See I National Research Council, Environmental Epidemiology: Public Health and
Hazardous Wastes (1991).
70. W. Brookes, Dead Wrong Again, 43 Nat'l Rev. 29 (1991).
71. The Competitiveness Council, headed by former Vice President Quayle, was
frequently criticized for its role in shaping regulations. This criticism reflects a natural
tension between Congress and the Executive Branch about the extent to which the White
House should be able to influence agency policy. Those critical of the Council, and its
predecessor, the Task Force on Regulatory Relief, point out the impact these bodies have on
"weakening" regulation. They typically ignore the fact that regulations may frequently not
achieve their intended goals or may do so in a way that wastes billions of dollars.
Moreover, they ignore the fact that the limited resources and political capital of the Council
does not permit it to become engaged in the day-to-day workings of the various agencies.
Indeed, Congress is much more well-suited to such tasks; the recent criticism of the Council
by concerned Democratic representatives suggests they intend to maintain their advantage
in influencing the policies of government agencies. See D. Priest, Competitiveness Council
Under Scrutiny, Wash. Post, Nov. 26, 1991, at A19. For a critical view of the Council, see J.
Mathews, Bush's Double Game, Wash. Post, Nov. 22, 1991, at A25. Mathews is a leading
environmentalist now serving in the Clinton Administration.
Ironically, Vice President Gore is now, taking a very active role in regulatory
decision making as well. See, for example, The Nanogramn Mafia, Wall St. J., June 29, 1993, at
A18.
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functions is within EPA, making more judicious use of the agency's
policy office to impose some intellectual discipline on the program
offices, who quite naturally wish to promote their programs.
In addition to ignoring the upward spiral in costs, there were
other important non-themes. The scope of regulation has been broadened
to include non-point sources of pollution, such as pesticides and cow
manure being washed into streams. The agency is also vigorously
pursuing an agenda aimed at measuring and defining risks to ecosys-
tems. Enforcement efforts have increased, as have the penalties for
violating the law. As noted above, there is increased rhetoric about
pollution prevention. Finally, more assistance on environmental problems
is being provided to developing countries in Eastern Europe and Latin
America. These areas of increased activity, while important, are labeled
as non-themes because they are largely unaffected by the President or the
party in power.
In summary, the Bush presidency made two important substan-
tive contributions to environmental policy that could change the nature
of the debate for the foreseeable future. The first is to introduce the idea
that market-based approaches to environmental improvement are
legitimate policy tools that can and should be applied where appropriate.
The second is to suggest that there are a multitude of ways to improve
the economy and the environment if we only try harder. The first is
constructive; the second is potentially dangerous. The free-lunch
philosophy tends to encourage policies that are highly inefficient from an
economic perspective.
4. WHITHER ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION?
Assuming the future of environmental regulation is related to
past trends and emerging political forces, one can develop some sense of
how federal environmental policy will evolve. Under President Clinton,
there will be a secular increase in the level of regulation, but nothing near
the level that Vice President Gore might like.' President Clinton is
more focused on economic issues and recognizes that he is unlikely to
lose the support of the environmental community to a Republican
candidate. At the same time, many of his political appointments are from
environmental groups, and thus can be expected to support more
regulation in this area, independent of the economic consequences.
Given the level of political rhetoric about the Competitiveness
Council, President Clinton chose to implement an executive order that
72. See A. Gore, Jr., Earth in the Balance: Ecology and the Human Spirit (1992).
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highlights openness in the regulatory decisionmaking process.73 Ironical-
ly, the substance of the Executive Order is remarkably similar to the
orders it replaces. Like the others, it calls for the maximization of net
benefits and the promulgation of cost-effective regulations where
possible; however, the new Executive Order appears to place more
weight on non-quantifiable benefits as well as considerations of equity
and distributive impacts.74
While it is too early to assess the impact of the Executive Order,
there are three changes that are likely to lead to the promulgation of
regulations that are less economically efficient than earlier regulations.
First, the scope of executive regulatory oversight has been narrowed to
significant regulatory actions.7' This means that some regulations that
will have potentially major impacts, and would have been reviewed
under previous executive orders, will not be reviewed by OMB under
this Executive Order. Second, the Executive Order has deadlines that will
force OMB to render a decision in a timely manner, even if the agency
promulgating the regulation fails to provide adequate information on
which to base a credible economic analysis.76 Third, reporting require-
ments on OMB personnel along with sunshine provisions; which require
agency personnel to be present at meetings with OMB and private
parties, are likely to increase congressional and agency power.','
One factor that could increase efficiency relative to previous
executive orders is the requirement that existing regulations be periodi-
cally reviewed. This idea, which builds on an effort undertaken at the
end of the Bush Administration, could have enormous benefits if
implemented seriously. However, the history of such efforts suggests that
they are likely to fall on deaf political ears, even if they are executed
faithfully.79
Ironically, while President Clinton and Vice President Gore railed
against the evils of the Quayle Competitiveness Council, the new
73. Exec. Order No. 12866,29 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 1925 (Sept. 30, 1993), reprinted in
1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. B82.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 889.
76. Id. at B91.
77. Id.
78. Congressional power will increase because OMB officials are unlikely to be required
to log phone calls from Congress and its staff, while calls and letters from the private sector
will have to be logged. Agency power is likely to increase because of the increase in require-
ments on OMB officials, who are already understaffed.
79. During the Bush Administration, many agencies provided excellent recommendations
on regulatory reform, which were largely ignored for political reasons. Several Bush
Administration officials were hopeful that these reforms would be implemented if President
Bush were reelected to a second term.
Spring 19941
NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL
Executive Order sets up a prominent role for the Office of the Vice
President.' Vice President Gore can be expected to use the power of his
office and the Executive Order to support policies that are pro-regulatory,
as his attempt to shut down a hazardous waste incinerator in Ohio
illustrates.8 As time goes by, however, it is likely that some attempt
will be made to rein in the costs of social regulation because of its
adverse impact on the economy.
This administration will continue to use rhetoric about the virtues
of market approaches for environmental protection and resource
management. There is likely to be increased use of these approaches.
Occasionally, the dreaded "t" word (tax) will also enter into the discus-
sion, as it did with the recent gasoline tax increase, but it is unlikely to
get very far in the near term; yet, the possibility of steeper energy or
gasoline taxes is very real within the time frame of a decade. The Bush
Administration was careful to leave environmental taxes (and "user"
charges) at the fringe of the discussion. In contrast, President Clinton
appears willing to experiment with increases in user charges, such as
grazing fees, to better manage resources.'
For Clinton, environmental policy is likely to remain a low
political priority unless his appointees force the issue, or external events
redirect his attention. This means that Vice President Gore and political
appointees are likely to shape environmental policy in the near term.
Administrator Browner appears to be lukewarm on the use of market-
based approaches for environmental protection. The Administration had
an opportunity to champion such initiatives in an agreement that Interior
Secretary Babbitt designed to protect the Everglades. Instead, it chose to
highlight the environmental advantages of the proposed agreement. It
also had an opportunity to highlight the use of markets for reducing
greenhouse gas emissions in the Climate Change Action Plan. Instead, the
plan highlighted the importance of achieving greenhouse gas emission
reductions through the use of a host of "voluntary" measures; markets
barely received an honorable mention. Nonetheless, there seems to* be
increasing recognition inside and outside the Clinton Administration that
market-oriented policies can actually improve economic productivity and
environmental quality. Examples include policies designed to raise
grazing fees, markets for improving water management and reducing air
80. id. at B84.
81. See, for example, K. Schneider, Gore Says Clinton Will Try to Halt Incinerator, N.Y. Times,
Dec. 7, 1992, at D9.
82. The Bush presidency did take credit for imposing an excise tax on the sale of chloro-
fluorocarbons, but this was largely a back-room maneuver implemented with the primary
intent of raising revenues. Interestingly, the tax may have been set high enough to reduce
domestic production. See Communications and Public Affairs, supra note 25, at 15.
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pollution, and the removal of subsidies for logging on government-
owned land.
The impact of government programs, most notably defense-
related activities, on the environment will become a larger issue. The
crude estimates of the dollars required to clean up old weapons facilities
and dispose of old weapons are staggering.' Moreover, no one really
believes that many of these cleanups will actually be completed because
of the high costs. The Defense Department can be expected to seize the
opportunity to enter a new line of business.
Over a longer time frame, the changing attitudes of the public
will begin to have a marked impact on businesses and consumers.
Pollution prevention will become a reality as it becomes prohibitively
expensive to put wastes in anyone's backyard. Moreover, there will be
increasing pressure on firms to supply data on their environmental
activities. As noted above, the Toxics Release Inventory provides a strong
incentive for firms to reduce emissions. This pressure is likely to continue
in the future. Moreover, the information requirements are likely to be
extended to smaller and smaller firms. Complementing the requirements
to provide more public information on emissions are greater demands to
have outsiders who are viewed as pro-environmental participate in the
management of firms. This all adds up to greater scrutiny of day-to-day
management decisions.
At least over the next decade, states will play a more important
role in starting new environmental initiatives. California has been
"ahead" of federal regulators for quite some time, but other states are
now following suit with their own environmental initiatives. The increase
in activity at the state level results from the benefits politicians can obtain
from staking out policy positions that are seen as environmentally
progressive. Prime candidates for state-led environmental initiatives
include interstate shipment of hazardous wastes, automobile and fuel
standards, product labeling, recycling requirements and packaging rules.
In addition, states have taken the lead in adding environmental costs to
the price of electricity paid by consumers and business.
More experimentation with market-based approaches and
environmental taxes or energy taxes is also likely in the longer term.
Economists and environmentalists from all parts of the political spectrum
see some merit in trying to encourage consumers to pay the "full" cost
of pollution. The exact method for imposing such costs, be they through
charges or market-based approaches, is the subject of considerable debate.
So, too, is the discussion about who should receive the revenues
83. P. Passell, Experts Question Staggering Costs of Toxic Cleanups, N.Y. Times, Sept. 1, 1991,
at 1, § 1.
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associated with these various approaches. These differences notwithstand-
ing, there is a consensus emerging that could have an impact on policy.
Moreover, there is evidence that politicians on both sides of the aisle are
beginning to recognize the potential political value of endorsing economic
approaches to environmental protection.' Exactly how the use of
economic instruments for environmental protection will play out in the
political arena will depend, to a significant extent, on whether the
market-based approach used in the acid rain title of the Clean Air Act is
perceived to be a success.
As part of this move towards using economic incentives, there
could be substantial changes in the tax structure over the next two
decades, moving away from income taxes and towards taxes based on
energy and pollution. The idea is not as far-fetched as it might first
appear. To place it in perspective, consider whether you would have
guessed ten years ago that a major piece of environmental legislation
would have contained a market-based approach toward reducing sulfur
oxides emissions that cause acid rain. The forces that could move
countries to substitute energy and pollution taxes for income taxes
include: (1) the argument that they protect the environment more
effectively and (2) the argument that they enhance economic efficiency. 5
Packaged in the right manner, with due consideration of how various
income groups would fare under a new tax regime, the right political
entrepreneur could make a compelling case."
There will be growing competition for green dollars both here
and abroad."' Firms are already competing with environmental adver-
tisements showing amber waves of grain in support of ethanol (never
mind the 54 cent/gallon subsidy), a pleasant colored liquid in a beaker
to encourage consumers to purchase cleaner gasoline, and ice cream that
promises to support politically correct environmental causes, such as the
84. Project 88: Harnessing Market Forces to Protect Our Environment-Initiatives for the
New President (R. Stavins ed., 1988) (a public policy study sponsored by Senator Timothy
E: Wirth & Senator John Heinz).
85. But see L. Goulder, Effects of Carbon Taxes in an Economy with Prior Tax Distortions: An
Intertemtporat General Equilibriun Analysis (1993) (Working Paper, Stanford University).
Goulder argues that energy taxes may lead to larger distortions than income taxes because
they serve as an implicit tax on labor and capital and they also distort consumption choices
between energy and other products. Goulder's paper illustrates this idea for the case of a
carbon tax. The potential increase in tax distortions must be weighted against the expected
environmental benefits from a tax shift.
86. The current political environment would probably require that a major shift from
income to environmental or energy taxes be accompanied by an overall reduction in taxes.
Even with such a reduction in overall taxes, the political battles can be expected to be fierce,
as there will be significant concentrated losers.
87. F. Cairncross, The Environment: An Enemy, and Yet a Friend, The Economist, Sept. 8,
1990, at 3.
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preservation of rain forests in 'Brazil. The claims made by firms are
becoming harder for consumers and regulators to evaluate. Pressure will
continue to grow for state and federal governments to provide standards
for green labeling and advertising. Consumers would like to know
whether cloth diapers are more environmentally sound than disposable
diapers. The problem is that these issues are difficult to resolve. The
result will be a set of environmental labels and claims that are only
tangentially related to environment quality, but which allows firms to
compete on the green dimension.'8
In terms of legislation, there will continue to be efforts to avoid
allowing cost and cost/benefit comparisons to be made. The 1990 Clean
Air Act Amendments and drinking water standards provide good
examples. In the near term, these efforts will be successful." It is too
risky politically for environmentalists to allow trade offs among goals,
even environmental goals, to be introduced explicitly within the
legislative or regulatory process.
Environmental groups will continue to grow in power and
numbers. The environmental devastation that has occurred in Eastern
Europe and the Soviet Union will allow these groups to broaden their
agenda, and develop an even more sophisticated world-wide network
that can be used to mobilize public opinion on selected issues of their
choosing.
At the same time, however, there will be increasing resistance to
environmental absolutism. This resistance can be expected to come from
groups that are directly affected by environmental regulations, such as
property owners, and municipalities that are required to implement costly
environmental mandates. Over time, these kinds of groups can be
expected to have an important moderating impact on environmental
policy. They will help convince the public that there are real costs, as well
as benefits, to environmental policy. The likely outcome is that greater
consideration will be given to costs in the development of new environ-
mental laws and regulations.
International and regional problems will remain on the agenda.
Environmentalists will find new opportunities in the international trade
88. Labeling a small set of products is likely to be costly and largely ineffective in an
advanced industrial economy, such as the U.S. economy. Using the price system is a much
more effective way of transmitting information to hundreds of millions of decision makers.
The price system in the U.S. does a reasonably good job at transmitting information about
the scarcity value of resources. While the price system is not perfect, it is likely to dominate
other ad hoc approaches, such as selective labeling. Where there are significant externalities
or market failures, then some form of regulation is appropriate, which attempts to
internalize these costs.
89. There could be legislation that will require some consideration of costs and benefits,
but this legislation is not likely to have a major impact on agency behavior.
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arena, where they will argue for the harmonization of environmental
standards across countries. Environmentalists will also continue to push
for a major international treaty on climate change. There is unlikely to be
a significant multilateral agreement that addresses substance unless the
science settles down. Some countries may act on their own or in small
groups, but bringing in major actors such as China, India and countries
that formerly made up the Soviet Union will be difficult. The low average
standard of living in some of these countries will make it difficult to
reach a binding agreement without substantial offers of aid from
developed countries.
Efforts aimed at curbing the excesses of environmental regula-
tions will be largely unsuccessful if carried out at the White House level.
The only way to sensibly address these issues is through a joint effort
between the White House and political appointees at EPA; this effort
would require leadership that is willing to take some political heat. This
willingness will vary with the Administration and the economic
conditions.
In conclusion, environmental regulation will continue to be a
growth industry for the foreseeable future. How this industry grows
could have a dramatic impact on how we live from day to day. Right
now, this growth industry is being driven by the inertia inherent in past
legislation as well as the changing preferences of the electorate. It is also
being affected by new scientific and economic findings about how the
environment affects our quality of life and how our quality of life affects
the environment. We need to spend a great deal more effort understand-
ing these linkages if we are to forge a future in which our children's
children can enjoy a richer set of resources than we inherited.
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